Crowd-MECS: A Novel Crowdsourcing Framework for Mobile Edge Caching and
  Sharing by Jiang, Changkun et al.
1Crowd-MECS: A Novel Crowdsourcing Framework
for Mobile Edge Caching and Sharing
Changkun Jiang, Member, IEEE, Lin Gao, Senior Member, IEEE, Tong Wang, Member, IEEE,
Yufei Jiang, Member, IEEE, and Jianqiang Li, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Crowdsourced mobile edge caching and sharing
(Crowd-MECS) is emerging as a promising content delivery
paradigm by employing a large crowd of existing edge devices
(EDs) to cache and share popular contents. The successful
technology adoption of Crowd-MECS relies on a comprehensive
understanding of the complicated economic interactions and
strategic decision-making of different stakeholders. In this paper,
we focus on studying the economic and strategic interactions
between one content provider (CP) and a large crowd of EDs,
where the EDs can decide whether to cache and share contents
for the CP, and the CP can decide to share a certain revenue
with EDs as the incentive of caching and sharing contents. We
formulate such an interaction as a two-stage Stackelberg game.
In Stage I, the CP aims to maximize its own profit by deciding
the ratio of revenue shared with EDs. In Stage II, EDs aim to
maximize their own payoffs by choosing to be agents who cache
and share contents, and meanwhile gain a certain revenue from
the CP, or requesters who do not cache but request contents in the
on-demand fashion. We first analyze the EDs’ best responses and
prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in Stage
II by using the non-atomic game theory. Then, we identify the
piece-wise structure and the unimodal feature of the CP’s profit
function, based on which we design a tailored low-complexity
one-dimensional search algorithm to achieve the optimal revenue
sharing ratio for the CP in Stage I. Simulation results show that
both the CP’s profit and the EDs’ total welfare can be improved
significantly (e.g., by 120% and 50%, respectively) by using the
proposed Crowd-MECS, comparing with the Non-MEC system
where the CP serves all EDs directly.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, mobile edge caching, peer con-
tent sharing, game theory, network economics.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
W ITH the rapid proliferation of various data-intensivemobile devices, mobile data traffic has been increasing
dramatically in recent years. According to Cisco, the monthly
worldwide traffic reached 12 exabytes in 2017, and will further
increase sevenfold over the next five years [2]. Such traffic vol-
ume has posed a huge challenge for the mobile network, which
has been broadly identified as the bottleneck of the mobile
Internet. To reduce the mobile network burden, mobile edge
caching (MEC) [3]–[7] is emerging as a promising paradigm,
by caching the popular Internet contents at network edges, e.g.,
base stations and end devices. The practical implementation
of MEC relies heavily on the participation of massive edge
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devices (EDs) for contributing their storage resources to form
the edge storage pool. This leads to a novel crowdsourcing-
based [8]–[10] mobile edge caching and sharing service called
Crowd-MECS. More specifically, in Crowd-MECS, massive
EDs (e.g., mobile smartphones, WiFi routers, and smallcell
base stations) are used to cache popular contents at network
edges and then share with each other in a decentralized
peer-to-peer and on-demand fashion. Owing to such widely
distributed EDs, Crowd-MECS has been adopted by many
practical applications [11]–[13].
While the system design and optimization of Crowd-MECS
have been extensively studied [14], the economic issues of
Crowd-MECS have been heavily overlooked. To enable the
technology adoption and commercial deployment of Crowd-
MECS, it is critical to understand the economic and strategic
interactions of the intelligent participants (e.g., EDs and Inter-
net Content Providers, CPs) involved in such a system. This
is because both EDs and CPs belong to various self-governed
entities, who aim to maximize their respective benefits. On
one hand, EDs will incur certain cost on themselves when
caching and sharing contents, as they consume the com-
putation, communication, and storage resources. Thus, they
may not be willing to participate in such a system unless
satisfactory compensations are provided. On the other hand,
EDs’ participation will benefit CPs, as it can reduce the
CPs’ content delivery cost and improve the quality-of-services.
Therefore, it is possible to reach the win-win situation, as long
as CPs can offer suitable economic incentives to incentivize
the EDs’ participation in the Crowd-MECS system to cache
and share contents.
The CP’s content delivery problem has been a long-standing
problem along with the boom in the multimedia streaming of
the Internet. Previous solutions mainly focused on optimizing
the content delivery network (CDN) for efficient content
transmission. Such solutions are usually expensive since CDN
is often operated by leading commercial companies such as
Akamai in US [15], KeyCDN in Europe [16], as well as Chi-
naCache and Alibaba Cloud in China [17], [18]. Different from
the CDN solution, Crowd-MECS provides a cost-effective
approach by leveraging the power of the crowd at the network
edges for content caching and delivery [19]. Along with this
line, several recent studies have focused on the edge caching
and content sharing issues [20]–[30]. Specifically, some of
the above works studied the content caching problem with
D2D-based content transmission among EDs (e.g., [20]–[27]).
For example, Chen et al. in [25] proposed an opportunistic
cooperative D2D transmission scheme, where different files
are cached at the users locally. The other works studied the
problem of data sharing in edge caching systems (e.g., [28]–
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2[30]). For example, Huang et al. in [28] considered the fair and
efficient caching algorithms for enabling data sharing in edge
caching. However, the above works focused primarily on the
optimization of content caching (e.g., content placement and
eviction strategies) or content sharing (e.g., fair and efficient
content sharing), without considering the economic incentive
issue of the joint content caching and sharing. The economics
of caching has been identified as one of the least explored
research areas [14]. Prior works in this area focused primarily
on the cooperative caching mechanisms and the associated
pricing design [14], and none of them considered the economic
interactions in the Crowd-MECS system.
B. Solution and Contribution
To fill the gap, we proceed to conduct the economic analysis
of Crowd-MECS by considering the strategic interactions
induced by one CP and multiple EDs in the Crowd-MECS
system. In particular, in the Crowd-MECS system, the CP
determines the incentive mechanism offered to the EDs for
stimulating the content caching and sharing to reduce its cost
of serving all EDs directly. More specifically, the CP designs
and announces the detailed incentive mechanism to EDs, and
EDs determine whether to cache contents or not, depending on
both the incentive scheme that the CP offers and the caching
cost that she incurs. This leads to a caching and sharing market
between the CP and EDs. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of such
a Crowd-MECS system, where two green EDs (a mobile ED
and a fixed ED) cache contents and share the cached contents
with other red EDs, and the CP offers incentives to the green
EDs for content caching.
In this work, we aim to study how will the CP and the
EDs interact strategically and intelligently in such a joint
caching and sharing market, taking into account the selfishness
and rationality of CP and EDs (who want to maximize their
own benefits). More specifically, we consider the following
practical features in such a scenario. First, the CP, who has
the dominant power in the market, will design and offer the
incentive scheme to EDs in advance. Second, EDs, who are
rational and self-motivated in the market, can decide whether
to cache contents by themselves. Third, EDs are heterogeneous
in the sense that they may incur different costs when caching
the same content. Forth, EDs have limited capacity of caching
and serving other EDs, due to the limits of caching storage
and physical data transmission link. In summary, the CP act as
the leader and determines the incentive mechanisms, while the
heterogeneous EDs act as followers and determine the caching
and sharing decisions. In particular, we aim to explore the
following two important and interdependent problems:
• how to capture the EDs’ choices evolution and whether
the evolution will reach the stable market equilibrium
point, given the CP’s incentive scheme?
• how to capture the impact of the CP’s incentive mecha-
nism on the market equilibrium of the EDs’ choices and
what is the CP’s optimal incentive scheme?
We explore the two interdependent questions by modeling
the strategic interplay of the CP and EDs as a two-stage
Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the CP designs the optimal

	
Fixed EDs
(e.g., WiFi Routers)
Mobile EDs
(e.g., Smartphones)

	


	

CP’s Cloud
Server 
	

	


Fig. 1. An Example of the Crowd-MECS System. Two green EDs (one mobile
ED and one fixed ED) are incentivized to cache contents and share the cached
contents with the red EDs.
incentive offered to EDs, aiming at maximizing its profit. In
Stage II, each ED decides the optimal role, i.e., being an agent
(who caches and shares with others) or a requester (who does
not cache but requests contents from other agents), aiming
at maximizing her own benefit. We analyze the Stackelberg
equilibrium systematically by using backward induction. First,
given the CP’s decision in Stage I, we analyze EDs’ best
responses and characterize the EDs’ equilibrium with the
non-atomic game-theoretic analysis. Then, with the derived
equilibrium in Stage II, we optimize the CP’s best decision in
Stage I. Finally, based on the above analysis, we further study
the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
In summary, the main results and key contributions of this
work are summarized as follows.
• Novel Crowdsourcing-based Edge Caching Model: To our
best knowledge, this is the first work that studies the eco-
nomics of joint edge caching and peer content sharing in
a Crowd-MECS system. We formulate a two-stage game-
theoretic model for capturing the interactions between
one CP and multiple EDs, and provide a comprehensive
analysis for their strategic and economic interplay.
• EDs’ Equilibrium Behaviors in Stage II: We characterize
the best responses of EDs by using the non-atomic game-
theoretic analysis. Based on the best response analysis,
we further analyze the existence and uniqueness of the
EDs’ equilibrium in Stage II. Such a unique equilibrium
is desirable for predicting the strategic and intelligent
behaviors of EDs in Crowd-MECS.
• Optimal Incentive Design in Stage I: Based on the
EDs’ equilibrium analysis, we further design the CP’s
optimal incentive that maximizes its profit. To reduce
complexity, we exploit the piece-wise and unimodal
features of the CP’s profit, and design a tailored low-
complexity derivative-free algorithm to obtain the CP’s
optimal incentive decision.
• Performance Evaluation and Insights: Simulation results
show that (i) the welfare (total payoffs) of all EDs at the
equilibrium (NE) is less than the optimal social welfare
(SO) benchmark (all EDs are coordinated to maximize the
total payoffs), due to the non-cooperative and strategic
decision making of EDs. (ii) Both the welfare at NE
3and the welfare at SO increase with the CP’s incentive,
and a larger incentive leads to a larger welfare loss of
EDs (i.e., more significant strategic effect). (iii) A smaller
content transmission cost or a larger serving capacity of
EDs can incentivize more EDs to become agents and
in the meantime achieve a higher EDs’ welfare at NE.
(iv) A larger CP’s content price leads to a larger CP’s
profit but a smaller EDs’ welfare, showing that a tradeoff
exists between CP’s profit and EDs’ welfare by tuning
the content price. (v) Furthermore, both the CP’s profit
and the EDs’ welfare can be improved significantly (e.g.,
by 120% and 50%, respectively) by using the proposed
Crowd-MECS, comparing with the Non-MEC system
where the CP serves all requesting EDs directly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the detailed system model in Section II, and formulate the
strategic interplay as a two-stage game in Section III. In
Section IV, we analyze the EDs’ equilibrium in Stage II, given
the CP’s incentive decision in Stage I. In Section V, we move
back to Stage I and analyze the CP’s optimal revenue sharing
incentive. Finally, we present the simulation results in Section
VI, and conclude in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a simple yet generic Crowd-MECS model
consisting of one CP at the cloud and a set I = {1, · · · , I} of
EDs at the network edge. The CP provides contents for EDs
through a remote cloud server. The EDs request contents from
the CP and meanwhile can cache some contents on their device
storages. As shown in Fig. 1, EDs can be mobile handheld
devices (e.g., smartphones) serving their owners or fixed
network devices (e.g., WiFi routers) serving their subscribers.
When caching some contents on the device storage, each ED
can further share the cached contents with other EDs in a peer-
to-peer fashion. Moreover, caching and sharing a content with
others will incur certain caching cost to the ED, and such
a cost depends on different factors such as the device type,
battery level, and CPU status.
The peer content sharing between two EDs can be achieved
by the local D2D communication technology such as WiFi
Direct [31] and LTE Direct [32], or through the remote Internet
connection. To facilitate the peer content sharing among EDs,
the CP’s cloud server can record the caching status (e.g., which
contents does each ED cache) and the network parameters
(e.g., IP address) of all EDs. Such information can be eas-
ily obtained through existing techniques such as the instant
messaging technique.
there are two possible ways for an ED to obtain each
content: (i) acting as an agent, requesting the content from
the cloud server (and meanwhile caching the content), and
(ii) acting as a requester, requesting the content from an
agent and not caching the content. The peer content sharing
is useful for those EDs, who cannot cache contents on their
own devices (e.g., subject to the available storage constraint)
or who will incur a large cost of caching (e.g., subject to the
battery constraint). As the peer content sharing can reduce
the CP’s content delivery cost significantly, the CP will direct
the requesters’ content demands to agents preferentially. Only
when the total serving capacity of all agents is not sufficient
to meet the total content demands of all requesters, the CP
will serve the remaining content demands by its remote server
on the cloud.1
B. CP Model
For each content, the CP can serve EDs in two different
ways: (i) serving EDs directly via its cloud server, i.e., offering
the content on the cloud server to the requesting EDs directly,
and (ii) serving EDs indirectly via edge caching, i.e., caching
the content on some EDs (agents) and offering the cached
content on agents to the requesting EDs.2 The CP is a
commercial company who seeks for profit from providing the
content service. In this work, we assume that the CP adopts
the widely-used fixed pricing scheme, where each ED pays a
fixed price (denoted by p) to the CP for obtaining the content,
no matter from the cloud server or from an agent.
Moreover, if an ED is served by the cloud server, the CP
incurs a certain cost for delivering the content from the cloud
to the ED. We denote sCD as such a content delivery cost. To
reduce the content delivery cost especially during peak times,
the CP can design and offer an incentive scheme to EDs, so as
to incentivize EDs to cache and share contents with each other.
In this work, we consider the widely adopted revenue sharing
scheme for the CP, in which the CP shares a certain portion
of the obtained revenue with an ED who caches contents and
serves other EDs by using her cached contents. Let η ∈ [0, 1]
denote the revenue sharing ratio provided by the CP.
C. ED Model
As mentioned before, an ED can choose two different roles
for each content: (i) acting as an agent, requesting and caching
the content from the cloud server, and (ii) acting as a requester,
requesting the content from an agent. Moreover, an ED can
also choose to not request a content, which we call an alien.
This happens when the cost of obtaining the content is larger
than the benefit from the content.
When obtaining a content (either from the remote cloud
server or from a local agent), an ED i ∈ I can achieve a
certain valuation (denoted by wi) from the content.3 Moreover,
when choosing to be an agent and cache the content, an
ED i ∈ I will incur a certain caching cost, denoted by ci.
The serving capacity of each agent for sharing contents with
requesters is constrained by realistic factors such as the limited
uplink communication capability. To capture such a feature,
we assume that for each content, the agent’s serving capacity
is B. That is, at most B units of requesters’ demand can be
1We assume that requesters are impatient such that they will not wait for the
future service from agents, which is true for many delay-sensitive applications
like online video content.
2In this work, we consider that each content is operated independently, and
assume no correlation among different contents. When different contents are
correlated, the coupled decisions of caching and sharing need to be jointly
considered. We leave the analysis of such a scenario to our future work.
3That is, there is no difference in terms of the content valuation achieved
for a requesting ED when obtaining the content from the CP or an agent.
4served by each agent for each content. If the requesters’ total
demand exceeds the agents’ total serving capacity, then the
CP will serve the extra demand by the cloud server.
When sharing the content with a requester, the agent incurs
a certain uploading cost, denoted by sU, while the requester
incurs a certain downloading cost, denoted by sD. Here, we
assume that all EDs experience the same (average) uploading
cost sU and the same (average) downloading cost sD. We
further assume that the uploading cost is approximately same
as the downloading cost, i.e., sU = sD = s. This is often
true because both costs are primarily counted as the last-mile
network bandwidth cost when transferring content between
any two transceiver EDs [33].
Based on the above, we can find that each ED i ∈ I can be
distinguished by two parameters: wi and ci. In practice, both
the CP and EDs may selfishly seek to maximize their own
benefits, due to the rational and strategic natures. Hence, it is
necessary to capture such strategic interactions from the game-
theoretic perspective. To this end, we will show the detailed
game formulation next.
III. TWO-STAGE STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we will formulate the interplay of the CP
and the EDs as a two-stage game. In this game, the CP decides
the optimal incentive in Stage I and the EDs choose their roles
in Stage II. The role selection subgame of EDs (players) in
Stage II is a non-cooperative game, because each ED aims at
maximizing her own benefit. Next, we will present the detailed
role selection strategy profile and the corresponding payoffs
of this non-cooperative game.
A. Strategy Profile of EDs
we consider a generic ED i ∈ I for any given content.
For simplicity, we can omit the subscript i unless causing
confusion. That is, for ED i, we will henceforth write the
parameters wi and ci as w and c, respectively. Furthermore,
we are able to use the two-tuples (w, c) to denote EDs’ types.
To capture the heterogeneous types of EDs, we assume that
the two parameters w and c are independent and identically
distributed. For tractable analysis, we further assume uniform
distributions over [0, 1], and denote by gwc(w, c) the joint
distribution over (w, c) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].4
As we have mentioned, for a particular content, an ED can
choose to act as an agent or a requester for obtaining the
content, or to act as an alien who does not participate. To
specify EDs’ choices, we denote by zwc ∈ {AG, RE, NA} the
role selection strategy of a type-(w, c) ED, where
• zwc = AG: choosing to be an agent for the content;
• zwc = RE: choosing to be a requester for the content;
• zwc = NA: choosing to be an alien for the content.
The objective of each ED is to maximize her own payoff by
choosing the proper role zwc. It is notable that an ED’s payoff
depends jointly on her own decision and other EDs’ decisions.
4The analysis procedure in the following sections actually applies with
general distributions of w and c. Compared with the uniform distribution,
the difference is that closed-form solutions may not be available, such that
numerical methods are necessary to understand the game equilibrium.
TABLE I
KEY NOTATIONS
Symbols Physical Meaning
I = {1, · · · , I} Set of EDs
IAG , IRE , INA Sets of Agents, Requesters, and Aliens
η CP’s revenue sharing ratio
p CP’s content price
wi or w Valuation of ED i
ci or c Caching cost of ED i
sCD CP’s content delivery cost
sD , sU EDs’ content downloading and uploading costs
zwc ∈ {AG, RE, NA} Role selections of EDs with type-(w, c)
Πwc(zwc) Payoff of EDs with type-(w, c) when choosing role zwc
Ψ(η) or Ψ Sharing benefit for Agents
V(η) Total profit of the CP
Wso Total welfare of all EDs
Such a dependent relationship is important for analyzing the
EDs’ equilibrium choices, and we will show the detailed
mutual effect next.
B. Payoffs of EDs
Given the role selection strategy set, we further derive the
corresponding payoffs. We denote by Πwc(zwc) the payoff of
choosing the strategy zwc. It is notable that, for convenience,
we have omitted other EDs’ strategies in Πwc(·).
1) Agents: When a type-(w, c) ED chooses the role of
being an agent (i.e., zwc = AG), the ED obtains the content
from the CP and caches in the meantime. By being an agent,
the ED obtains the valuation w and incurs three costs: a fixed
price p, a downloading cost sD, and a caching cost c. Recall
that the agent can obtain a certain reward by sharing with other
EDs. We assume that each requester will be pushed to agents
uniformly at random. This simplified assumption enables each
agent to obtain a uniform sharing benefit on average. We
denote the sharing benefit by Ψ(η), as it depends on the CP’s
revenue sharing incentive η. Taking into account all benefits
and costs, the payoff of a type-(w, c) agent with type-(w, c)
can be determined by
Πwc(AG) = w − p− sD − c+ Ψ(η). (1)
It turns out that Ψ(η) depends jointly on the number of agents
and requesters, and the serving capacity of agents. We leave
the detailed derivation of Ψ(η) to Section III-D.
2) Requesters: When a type-(w, c) ED chooses the role of
being a requester (i.e., zwc = RE), the ED will be served by an
agent or the cloud server, and does not cache the content. In
this process, the requesting ED achieves the valuation w, pays
the CP a fixed price p, and bears the downloading cost sD.
This is similar to the choice of being an agent. The difference
is that the requesting ED does not cache or share the content,
such that no caching cost c incurs and no sharing benefit Ψ(η)
produces. Taking into account all benefits and costs, the payoff
of a type-(w, c) requester can be determined by
Πwc(RE) = w − p− sD. (2)
5By comparing (1) and (2), we can see that EDs will be
incentivized to be agents only if the sharing benefit is no less
than the caching cost, i.e., Ψ(η) ≥ c ≥ 0.
3) Aliens: When a type-(w, c) ED chooses the role of being
an alien (i.e., zwc = NA), the ED does not cache or request.
Hence, the payoff of a type-(w, c) alien can be determined by
Πwc(NA) = 0 (3)
The key notations we have introduced so far are summarized
in Table I. Notice that an ED’s payoff depends jointly on
her own decision and other EDs’ decisions. That is, each
ED chooses her decision zwc to maximize her own payoff,
taking other EDs’ decisions into consideration. Such a strategic
interaction leads to a non-cooperative game among EDs.
Furthermore, the CP’s incentive mechanism also influences
the EDs’ role selections. Next, we will show the two-stage
game and the non-cooperative game of EDs.
C. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game Formulation
We formulate the two-tiered sequential interplay of the
CP and the crowd of EDs as a two-stage leader-follower
Stackelberg game, as shown in Fig. 2. In this game, the CP
is the leader who determines the incentive offered to the EDs,
and the EDs are followers who choose their roles accordingly.
Stage I: The CP
determines the revenue
sharing ratio η to
maximize its profit.
Stage II: The EDs
determine role selections
{zwc} to maximize
their own payoffs.
Fig. 2. Two-Stage Leader-Follower Stackelberg Game for Crowd-MECS
In particular, in the above two-stage game, the CP deter-
mines the incentive η in Stage I to maximize its profit V(η),
which will be derived in the next subsection. Given the Stage
I decision η, the strategic EDs play a non-cooperative game
in Stage II, which is defined as follows.
• Players: all participating EDs in the system, each of
whom has an inherent type stamp (w, c);
• Strategies: each type-(w, c) ED can choose from a total
of three strategies, denoted by zwc ∈ {AG, RE, NA};
• Payoffs: given the three strategies, the EDs’ payoffs are
determined by (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
For tractable analysis, we assume that the number of EDs
I in Stage II is sufficiently large, which allows us to ig-
nore the impact of each single ED’s choice on the system.
Such an assumption has been widely adopted for obtaining
analytical results, and the resultant game is often called the
non-atomic game [34]. The non-atomic game model can
provide the asymptotic result for the atomic counterpart, which
approximates a system with a small number of players. The
corresponding equilibrium is called Wardrop equilibrium [34].
Such an equilibrium is often easier to compute, yet often
well approximates Nash equilibrium. In the following, we will
focus on the Wardrop equilibrium for the Stage II subgame.
D. Stackelberg Equilibrium Definition
The proposed two-stage game admits the so-called Stackel-
berg equilibrium as the solution concept. We can analyze such
an equilibrium through backward induction. More specifically,
we begin with analyzing the EDs’ equilibrium in Stage II,
given the Stage I decision η. Then, with the derived EDs’
equilibrium, we move back to Stage I and optimize the CP’s
decision η. The Stage I decision η and the EDs’ equilibrium
jointly form the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game.
1) EDs’ Equilibrium in Stage II: Before analyzing the EDs’
equilibrium, we first give the formal definition as follows.5
Definition 1 (EDs’ Equilibrium). Given the Stage I decision η,
an EDs’ (Wardrop) equilibrium in Stage II is an EDs’ strategy
profile {z∗wc,∀w, c} such that
Πwc(z
∗
wc) ≥ Πwc(zwc), ∀zwc ∈ {AG, RE, NA},
for any ED in I with any type-(w, c).
Given an EDs’ strategy profile {zwc,∀w, c}, the EDs’ mar-
ket will be divided into three parts, each of which corresponds
to one of three roles of EDs. For ease of presentation, we call
them market shares of EUs’ choices, and denote IAG, IRE, and
INA as the sets of agents, requesters, and aliens, respectively.
Then, the three market shares can be given by
IAG = {(w, c) : zwc = AG},
IRE = {(w, c) : zwc = RE},
INA = {(w, c) : zwc = NA}. (4)
Given the market shares IAG, IRE, and INA, we further derive
the corresponding sharing benefit Ψ(η). To proceed, we first
notice that to serve a requester, an agent incurs the uploading
cost sU of delivering the content. In the meantime, the agent
obtains the fraction η of the revenue p that is paid to the CP.
This means that the agent’s benefit for serving one unit of the
requester is η · p− sU. Given the requesters in IRE, we further
derive the total sharing benefit (gain) as
G = I ·
∫∫
IRE
(η · p− sU)gwc(w, c)dwdc
= I · (η · p− sU) · |IRE|, (5)
where |IRE| denotes the area of IRE, which is the (normalized)
number of requesters. Similarly, the (normalized) number of
agents is denoted by |IAG|. Notice that if |IRE| exceeds the
agents’ total serving capacity B · |IAG|, then the total demand
served by the agents is exactly B · |IAG|. Hence, in this case
the sharing benefit to the agents can be determined by
G = I · (η · p− sU) ·B · |IAG|, if |IRE| > B · |IAG|. (6)
Recall that the total sharing benefit G will be equally shared
among agents, due to the scenario that each requester will be
pushed to agents uniformly at random). To proceed, given IAG,
we derive the total number of agents as
IAG = I ·
∫∫
IAG
gwc(w, c)dwdc = I · |IAG|. (7)
5Here, we consider the so-called symmetric equilibrium, under which the
same type of EDs in the game will always play the same strategy.
6Based on the above, the sharing benefit Ψ(η) obtained by an
agent can be determined by
Ψ(η) =
G
IAG
=

(ηp− sU) · |IRE|
|IAG| , if
|IRE|
|IAG| ≤ B,
(ηp− sU) ·B, if |IRE||IAG| > B.
(8)
Notice that the two branches in (8) represents the cases
in which the agents are enough and deficient to serve all
requesters, respectively. In particular, when |IRE||IAG| > B, the
agents cannot serve all the requesters, and the remaining
requesters I ·(|IRE|−B|IAG|) will be served by the CP directly.
From (8), we can see that Ψ(η) ≤ (p− sU) ·B for η ≤ 1. The
Crowd-MECS system is feasible only if Ψ(η) ≥ 0, leading to
the condition η ≥ sUp . Furthermore, if 0 ≤ η < sUp , then no
EDs become agents and all requesters will be served by the
CP. We call such a scenario as the Non-MEC system, and will
compare the two systems in the simulation section.6
2) CP’s Profit Maximization in Stage I: To maximize the
CP’s profit regarding the revenue sharing ratio, we need to
first analyze the total profit of the CP. Recall that p is the
price of per content request paid to the CP, sCD is the CP’s
delivery cost of per content request, and I · (|IRE| − B|IAG|)
is the extra requesters’ demands that exceed the agents’ total
serving capacities. Then, the CP’s total profit consists of three
parts as follows.
• The profit from the agents, which is equal to the net
benefit (p− sCD) multiplied by the number of agents I ·
|IAG|, i.e., I · (p− sCD) · |IAG|;
• The profit from the agent-serving requesters, which is
equal to the net benefit (1−η)·p multiplied by the number
of requesters I · |IRE|, i.e., I ·(1−η) ·p · |IRE| when agents
are enough to serve all requesters, or I ·(1−η)·p·B ·|IAG|
when agents are not enough;
• The profit from the CP-serving requesters when agents
are not enough, which is equal to the net benefit (p−sCD)
multiplied by the number of requesters served by the CP
I · (|IRE| −B|IAG|), i.e., I · (p− sCD) · (|IRE| −B|IAG|).
The CP’s objective is to maximize its total profit by de-
termining the revenue sharing ratio η offered to agents. It is
clear that a larger η will incentivize more EDs to become
agents, which benefits the CP for reducing more delivery costs.
However, paradoxically, a larger η will inevitably reduce more
of the CP’s benefits obtained from each request. This shows
that there exists a tradeoff between the CP’s cost saving and
benefit reduction when optimizing η. Such a tradeoff motivates
us to define a threshold η0 regarding the ratio η, under which
agents’ total serving capacities can exactly meet all requesters’
demands, i.e., |IRE||IAG| = B. Hence, given the threshold η0, the
CP’s total profit can be written as
V(η) =

I · [(p− sCD) · |IAG|+ (1− η) · p ·B · |IAG|
+ (|IRE| −B · |IAG|) · (p− sCD)], if η < η0,
I · [(p− sCD) · |IAG|+ (1− η) · p · |IRE|], if η ≥ η0.
(9)
6Here, we have defined Non-MEC as the scenario without caching or
sharing, such that the CP serves all EDs directly. The goal is to explore the
performance improvement of the joint caching and sharing in Crowd-MECS,
by comparing with the non-caching (hence no sharing) scenario in Non-MEC.
That is, the CP’s objective is to maximize the total profit V(η)
in (9), by optimizing the revenue sharing ratio η.
Next, we will first focus on the Stage II subgame equilib-
rium analysis in Section IV, and then we will consider the
Stage I revenue sharing ratio optimization in Section V.
IV. ED’S EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS IN STAGE II
In this section, given the CP’s decision of the revenue
sharing ratio η in Stage I, we analyze the EDs’ equilibrium
strategies in Stage II. Specifically, we first focus on EDs’
best responses analysis under any given market shares. Then,
we characterize the conditions and properties of the market
equilibrium. As the revenue sharing ratio η is given, we omit
the variable η in this section and write Ψ(η) as Ψ for brevity.
A. Best Response Analysis
The best response for a player in a game refers to the strat-
egy which brings about the best outcome, given other players’
chosen strategies. That is, the best responses characterize how
EDs update their choices, given any initial distributions of the
EDs’ market shares.
As we have mentioned, each ED can choose one of three
roles, depending on the payoff that can be achieved. Specifi-
cally, a type-(w, c) ED will choose the role of being an agent
(i.e., zwc = AG), if the payoff of being an agent is the highest
among all payoffs. That is,
Πwc(AG) > max{Πwc(NA),Πwc(RE)}. (10)
Solving the inequalities in (10) yields two conditions: w >
p+sD +c−Ψ and c < Ψ. That is, a type-(w, c) ED satisfying
the two conditions will choose the role of being an agent.7 We
thus have the new market share of agents, which is given by
I˜AG = {(w, c) : w > p+ sD + c−Ψ, c < Ψ} . (11)
Similarly, a type-(w, c) ED will choose the role of being a
requester (i.e., zwc = RE), if the payoff of being a requester
is the highest. That is,
Πwc(RE) > max{Πwc(AG),Πwc(NA)}. (12)
Solving the inequalities in (12) yields two conditions: w >
p + sD and c > Ψ. We thus have the new market share of
requesters, which is given by
I˜RE = {(w, c) : w > p+ sD, c > Ψ} . (13)
Moreover, a type-(w, c) ED will choose the role of being
an alien (i.e., zwc = NA), if the payoff of being an alien is the
highest. That is,
Πwc(NA) > max{Πwc(AG),Πwc(RE)}. (14)
Solving the inequalities in (14), we further have the condition:
w < min (p+ sD + c−Ψ, p+ sD) . We thus have the new
market share of aliens, which is given by
I˜NA = {(w, c) : w < min (p+ sD + c−Ψ, p+ sD)} . (15)
By considering the combinations of simultaneous equations
in (11), (13), and (15), we reach a conclusion that the
7We have ignored the equality case, due to the zero probability under the
setting with the continuous distributions.
7conditions of the new market shares I˜AG, I˜RE, and I˜NA can
be distinguished by three line segments as follows.
y1 : w = p+ sD + c−Ψ, (16)
y2 : c = Ψ, (17)
y3 : w = p+ sD. (18)
Fig. 3 illustrates the three line segments graphically. Specifi-
cally, EDs with type-(w, c) above the two line segments y1 and
y2 are agents (marked in brown), EDs with type-(w, c) below
the line segment y2 and above y3 are requesters (marked in
blue), and the remaining EDs are aliens (marked in yellow).
Given the new market shares I˜AG, I˜RE, and I˜NA, we are able
to compute the corresponding sharing benefit Ψ˜ as follows.
Ψ˜ =
∫∫
I˜RE η · p · gwc · (w, c)dwdc∫∫
I˜AG gwc(w, c)dwdc
. (19)
Here, the new sharing benefit Ψ˜ becomes a function of the
given sharing benefit Ψ. This is because the new market shares
I˜AG, I˜RE, and I˜NA are all functions of Ψ. Furthermore, we
denote by G(Ψ) the newly derived total sharing benefit and
denote by IAG(Ψ) the newly derived number of agents, because
G and IAG are also functions of Ψ.
B. EDs’ Equilibrium Analysis
Given a particular strategy profile of EDs’ choices, if each
ED has no incentive to change the corresponding choice
unilaterally, then the strategy profile reaches the equilibrium,
which implies that EDs’ market shares and the resultant
sharing benefit remain unchanged accordingly. Such an aligned
structure leads to the equilibrium condition as follows.
Proposition 1. The EDs’ strategy profile {z∗wc, ∀w, c} forms
an equilibrium, if and only if the corresponding sharing benefit
Ψ∗ meets the following fixed-point equation.
Ψ∗ =
G(Ψ∗)
IAG(Ψ∗)
. (20)
The proof can be referred to Appendix A. Proposition 1
shows the necessary and sufficient condition of reaching the
equilibrium profile {z∗wc,∀w, c} in Stage II. That is, the fixed-
point equation Ψ∗ = G(Ψ
∗)
IAG(Ψ∗)
guarantees that the corresponding
strategy profile is the equilibrium of the Stage II subgame, and
the reverse is also true.
Based on the above, we will henceforth analyze the equi-
librium in Stage II regarding the sharing benefit Ψ. Ac-
cording to Proposition 1, it follows that the equilibrium Ψ
should satisfy the equation Ψ − G(Ψ)IAG(Ψ) = 0, or equivalently,
Ψ · IAG(Ψ)−G(Ψ) = 0. Hence, by defining the function
Θ(Ψ) = Ψ− G(Ψ)
IAG(Ψ)
, (21)
we can transform the equilibrium analysis regarding Ψ into
the problem of solving the equation Θ(Ψ) = 0.
Before we proceed, we first notice that, depending on
different values of Ψ, the three line segments y1, y2, and y3
may be relatively located in two cases, as shown in Fig. 3.
Specifically, in Fig.3(a), y1 intersects with c = c¯ for a high
sharing benefit Ψ, while y1 intersects with w = w¯ for a
low sharing benefit Ψ in Fig.3(b). We have to consider the
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Fig. 3. Graphical illustrations of the three line segments y1, y2, and y3.
The brown region denotes the choice to be Agents, the blue one denotes the
choice to be Requesters, and the yellow one denotes the choice to be Aliens.
two cases separately because different intersections will lead
to different expressions of G(Ψ) and IAG(Ψ). Moreover, to
simplify the equilibrium analysis and obtain more insights,
we will henceforth unify the uploading and the downloading
costs, i.e., sU = sD = s. Notice that this assumption is
mainly for obtaining clear results, and considering the two
costs separately is not likely to change the key results and
engineering insights because both sU and sD are constants.
1) Case 1. High Sharing Benefit: Here, the high sharing
benefit means that Ψ ≥ p + s, and we show such a case in
Fig.3(a). Recall that Ψ ≤ (p− s) ·B, hence we have p+ s ≤
Ψ ≤ (p − s) · B. Furthermore, by computing the integrals
over IRE and IAG with Fig. 3(a), we obtain the number of
requesters |IRE| = (1−Ψ)·(1−p−s) and the number of agents
|IAG| = 12 · (2Ψ−p−s) · (p+s)+Ψ · (1−p−s), respectively.
In order to determine the function Θ(Ψ), we need to check
the relationship of size between |IRE||IAG| and B. In particular, the
relationship of |IRE||IAG| ≤ B yields the following condition
Ψ ≥ 1− p− s+
B
2 · (p+ s)2
1− p− s+B , Ψ1. (22)
This shows that there are two subcases in terms of the
threshold Ψ1 and the lower bound p+ s.
Subcase 1.1. In this subcase the two values satisfy Ψ1 >
p + s, or equivalently, B < 2·(1−p−s)
2
(p+s)·(2−p−s) . This can be
illustrated in the following line segment.
∞p+ s Ψ10
In this subcase, the function Θ(Ψ) can be determined by
Θ(Ψ) =
Ψ− (ηp− s) ·
|IRE|
|IAG| , if Ψ ∈ [Ψ1, (p− s)B],
Ψ− (ηp− s) ·B, if Ψ ∈ [p+ s,Ψ1).
(23)
Subcase 1.2. In this subcase the two values satisfy Ψ1 ≤
p+s, which can be equivalently given by B ≥ 2·(1−p−s)2(p+s)·(2−p−s) .
This can be illustrated in the following line segment.
∞Ψ1 p+ s0
8In this subcase, the function Θ(Ψ) can be determined by
Θ(Ψ) = Ψ− (ηp−s) · |IRE||IAG| , ∀Ψ ∈ [p+s, (p−s)B]. (24)
It turns out that in the high sharing benefit case with
Ψ ≥ p + s, the Stage II subgame equilibrium can be unique
or nonexistent, which depends on two parameters B and η.
Furthermore, we are able to characterize the detailed condi-
tions for the uniqueness and the non-existence, respectively.
We summarize the key results in Proposition 2 as follows.
Proposition 2. When p + s ≤ Ψ ≤ (p − s)B, the existence
of the Stage II subgame equilibrium can be determined by the
parameter of the capacity B and the Stage I decision η. In
particular, when B < 2(1−p−s)
2
(p+s)(2−p−s) ,
• a unique equilibrium exists in the interval [Ψ1, (p−s)B],
if Ψ1Bp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ 1;
• a unique equilibrium exists in the interval [p+ s,Ψ1), if
p+s
Bp +
s
p ≤ η < Ψ1Bp + sp ;
• there does not exist any equilibrium in the interval [p+
s, (p− s)B], if sp ≤ η < p+sBp + sp .
When B ≥ 2(1−p−s)2(p+s)(2−p−s) ,
• a unique equilibrium exists in the interval [p+s, (p−s)B],
if (p+s)
2(2−p−s)
2p(1−p−s)2 +
s
p ≤ η ≤ 1;
• there does not exist any equilibrium in the interval [p+
s, (p− s)B], if sp ≤ η < (p+s)
2(2−p−s)
2p(1−p−s)2 +
s
p .
The proof can be referred to Appendix B. The existence
of the unique equilibrium enables us to predict the stable
state of the EDs’ strategic behaviors evolution. However, the
non-existent equilibrium means that the EDs cannot reach the
consensus of keeping a particular strategy. Such a scenario
is undesirable for the EDs and the CP’s decision in Stage I.
Fortunately, we can fix this problem by exploiting the unique
model structure, which will be elaborated in Section IV-C.
2) Case 2. Low Sharing Benefit: Here, the low sharing
benefit means that 0 ≤ Ψ < p + s, and we show such
a case in Fig. 3(b). By computing the integrals over IRE
and IAG with Fig. 3(b), we obtain the number of requesters
|IRE| = (1 − Ψ) · (1 − p − s) and the number of agents
|IAG| = 12Ψ2+(1−p−s)·Ψ, respectively. In order to determine
the function Θ(Ψ), we need to check the relationship of
size between |IRE||IAG| and B. In particular, the relationship of|IRE|
|IAG| ≤ B yields the condition Ψ ≥ Ψ2, where
Ψ2 , −(1− p− s) ·
(
1 + 1B
)
+
[
(1− p− s) · (1 + 1B )2 + 2B ] 12 · (1− p− s) 12 . (25)
This shows that there are two subcases in terms of the
threshold Ψ2 and the upper bound p+ s.
Subcase 2.1. In this subcase the two values satisfy Ψ2 <
p + s, which can be equivalently given by B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 .
This can be illustrated in the following line segment.
∞Ψ2 p+ s0
In this subcase, the function Θ(Ψ) can be determined by
Θ(Ψ) =
Ψ− (ηp− s) ·
|IRE|
|IAG| , if Ψ ∈ [Ψ2, p+ s],
Ψ− (ηp− s) ·B, if Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ2].
(26)
Subcase 2.2. In this subcase the two values satisfy Ψ2 ≥
p + s, which can be equivalently given by B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 .
This can be illustrated in the following line segment.
∞p+ s Ψ20
In this subcase, the function Θ(Ψ) can be determined by
Θ(Ψ) = Ψ− (ηp− s) ·B, ∀Ψ ∈ [0, p+ s]. (27)
Similarly, in the low sharing benefit case with Ψ < p+s, the
Stage II subgame equilibrium can be unique or nonexistent,
which depends on two parameters B and η. We show the de-
tailed conditions and the equilibrium results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. When 0 ≤ Ψ < p+s, the existence of the Stage
II subgame equilibrium can be determined by the parameter
of the capacity B and the Stage I decision η. In particular,
when B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 ,
• a unique equilibrium exists in the interval [0,Ψ2], if sp ≤
η ≤ Ψ2Bp + sp ;
• a unique equilibrium exists in the interval [Ψ2, p+ s], if
Ψ2
Bp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ (p+s)
2(2−p−s)
2p(1−p−s)2 +
s
p ;
• there does not exist any equilibrium in the interval [0, p+
s], if (p+s)
2(2−p−s)
2p(1−p−s)2 +
s
p < η ≤ 1.
When B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 ,
• a unique equilibrium exists in the interval [0, p + s], if
s
p ≤ η < p+sBp + sp ;
• there does not exist any equilibrium in the interval [0, p+
s], if p+sBp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ 1.
The proof can be referred to Appendix C. Similarly, the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are desirable,
while the non-existence of the equilibrium is undesirable.
Next, we will address this issue and further establish the
complete equilibrium results.
C. General Existence and Uniqueness of EDs’ Equilibrium
We have shown the non-existent equilibrium issue in the
preceding subsection. In this subsection, we will address
such an issue and further establish the general existence and
uniqueness results for the EDs’ equilibrium.
Combining the high and low sharing benefit cases discussed
in Section IV-B, we now focus on the equilibrium analysis
in the general sense. To proceed, we first transform the term
(p+ s)(2−p− s) into an equivalent form 2(p+ s)− (p+ s)2,
which can be further rewritten as 1− [1−2(p+s)+(p+s)2].
Hence, we finally reach the equivalent term 1− (1− p− s)2.
This means that the conditions in terms of the capacity B in
Propositions 2 and 3 coincide with each other. Furthermore,
the results in Propositions 2 and 3 are complementary, such
that the non-existence scenarios in Proposition 2 are in accord
with the uniqueness scenarios in Proposition 3, and the reverse
9is also true. By summarizing the key equilibrium results in
Propositions 2 and 3, we show the desirable equilibrium results
in the general sense as follows.
Theorem 1 (General Existence and Uniqueness). A unique
equilibrium regarding the sharing benefit Ψ exists for the
subgame in Stage II, which depends on the parameter of the
capacity B and the Stage I decision η. In particular, when
B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 ,
• if η satisfies sp ≤ η ≤ Ψ2Bp + sp , then a unique equilibrium
exists in the interval [0,Ψ2];
• if η satisfies Ψ2Bp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ (p+s)
2(2−p−s)
2p(1−p−s)2 +
s
p , then a
unique equilibrium exists in the interval [Ψ2, p+ s];
• if η satisfies (p+s)
2(2−p−s)
2p(1−p−s)2 +
s
p < η ≤ 1, then a unique
equilibrium exists in the interval [p+ s, (p− s)B].
When B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 ,
• if η satisfies sp ≤ η < p+sBp + sp , then a unique equilibrium
exists in the interval [0, p+ s];
• if η satisfies p+sBp +
s
p ≤ η < Ψ1Bp + sp , then a unique
equilibrium exists in the interval [p+ s,Ψ1);
• if η satisfies Ψ1Bp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ 1, then a unique equilibrium
exists in the interval [Ψ1, (p− s)B].
The proof can be referred to Appendix D. Intuitively, we can
see that the mutually exclusive and exhaustive equilibrium re-
sults in Proposition 2 and 3 completely characterize the unique
equilibrium results of the subgame in Stage II. Furthermore,
such unique equilibrium results can be explicitly summarized
by a few mutually exclusive and exhaustive intervals in terms
of the sharing benefit 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ (p− s)B, respectively.
Theorem 1 shows that a unique equilibrium Ψ∗(η) exists for
Stage II, given any possible Stage I decision η. To facilitate
the Stackelberg equilibrium analysis, in the following we move
back to Stage I and further optimize the CP’s decision η.
V. CP’S PROFIT MAXIMIZATION IN STAGE I
In this section, given the Stage II equilibrium Ψ∗(η), we
move back to Stage I and aim to maximize the CP’s total profit
V(η), by determining the optimal revenue sharing ratio η.
A. CP’s Total Profit
Recall that in Section III-D, we have derived the total profit
of the CP and the constraint regarding the CP’s revenue sharing
ratio η. That is, the CP’s total profit V(η) is given in (9).
Now we are ready to derive the optimal decision for the CP.
As we have mentioned, the CP aims to maximize its total profit
V(η), by determining the optimal revenue sharing ratio η. In
particular, if η is small, then fewer EDs will be incentivized
to be agents and it is likely that |IRE||IAG| > B. In this case more
requesters will be left and eventually be served by the CP
(with a larger transmission cost), leading to a smaller CP’s
profit V(η). On the other hand, a large η turns more EDs
into agents, such that it is likely that |IRE||IAG| ≤ B. In this case
all requesters can be served by the agents, such that more
revenues are shared to the agents, leading to a smaller CP’s
profit V(η).
Based on the above analysis, both a smaller η and a larger
η will lead to a smaller CP’s profit V(η), implying that the
maximal CP’s profit V(η) can only be achieved with a medium
value of η. In particular, one candidate solution η∗ can be
determined by the first-order condition as follows.
dV(η)
dη
=
dV(η)
dΨ(η)
· dΨ(η)
dη
= 0. (28)
From the proofs (Appendices B and C) of Propositions 2
and 3, we know that V(η) can be represented by a closed-
form polynomial function of Ψ(η). Hence, the derivative
dV(η)/dΨ(η) can be readily derived. However, the equilib-
rium Ψ∗(η) in Stage II does not have an explicit closed form.
Hence, the optimal revenue sharing ratio η cannot be computed
by directly solving the first-order condition (28). To address
this issue, next we will design a tailored derivative-free algo-
rithm with low complexity to solve the profit maximization
problem, by using the unique structure of the function V(η).
B. CP’s Profit Maximization Algorithm Design
From the expression of the CP’s profit V(η), we can see that
the threshold η0 plays an important role in determining V(η).
To explore such a problem structure, we first determine the
threshold η0. Specifically, given the structure of the equilib-
rium results in Section IV-C, we observe that the threshold η0
exhibits two possible cases regarding different values of B.
Such an observation enables us to obtain the threshold η0 in
closed form, as shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Given EDs’ equilibrium choices in Theorem 1,
the threshold η0 is determined by the conditions of the capacity
B. That is, if B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 , then η0 = Ψ1Bp + sp ; and if
B ≥ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 , then η0 = Ψ2Bp + sp .
The proof can be referred to Appendix E. Proposition 4
shows that the CP’s profit V(η) in (9) can be further divided
into four cases, depending on the capacity B and the threshold
η0. This shows that V(η) is piece-wise in η, satisfying the first
increasing and then decreasing properties. Such a structure
enables us to design efficient algorithms to compute the
optimal revenue sharing ratio η∗. In particular, we will design
a low-complexity one-dimensional iterative search algorithm
[35] for any given pair (Ψ∗(η), η) with η ∈ [s/p, 1].
We show the tailored one-dimensional search algorithm by
exploiting the piece-wise profit function V(η) in Algorithm 1.
More specifically, if B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 , the equilibrium Ψ
∗(η)
has two possible cases with respect to η, i.e., η ∈ [s/p, η0]
and η ∈ [η0, 1], respectively. Then, we search η to maximize
the corresponding V(η), as shown in lines 2-13. The case
for B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 can be derived similarly, as shown
in lines 14-25. For searching the optimal η∗ in each case,
many existing algorithms such as the golden section search
can be used. Furthermore, Algorithm 1 optimally solves the
profit maximization problem with the O(log 1 ) complexity,
where  denotes that the output of the search algorithm η◦
is no more than  away from the actual maximizer η∗, i.e.,
lim
n→∞ |η
◦ − η∗| ≤ . Specifically, we show the complexity of
Algorithm 1 in the following proposition.
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Algorithm 1: One-Dimensional Search for the CP’s Op-
timal Revenue Sharing Ratio
Input: Stage II subgame equilibrium Ψ∗(η)
Output: Optimal revenue sharing ratio η◦
1 Compute |IAG| and |IRE| according to the Input;
2 if B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 then
3 if Ψ∗(η) ∈ [0,Ψ2] then
4 while |η◦(k + 1)− η◦(k)| <  do
5 Find η† ∈ [ sp , Ψ2Bp + sp ] that maximizes the
function I[(p− sCD)|IAG|+ (1−
η)pB|IAG|+ (|IRE| −B|IAG|)(p− sCD)];
6 Set η◦(k) = η† and k = k + 1;
7 end
8 end
9 if Ψ∗(η) ∈ [Ψ2, (p− s)B] then
10 while |η◦(k + 1)− η◦(k)| <  do
11 Find η† ∈ [ Ψ2Bp + sp , 1] that maximizes the
function I[(p− sCD)|IAG|+ (1− η)p|IRE|];
12 Set η◦(k) = η† and k = k + 1;
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 if B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 then
17 if Ψ∗(η) ∈ [0,Ψ1] then
18 while |η◦(k + 1)− η◦(k)| <  do
19 Find η† ∈ [ sp , Ψ1Bp + sp ] that maximizes the
function I[(p− sCD)|IAG|+ (1−
η)pB|IAG|+ (|IRE| −B|IAG|)(p− sCD)];
20 Set η◦(k) = η† and k = k + 1;
21 end
22 end
23 if Ψ∗(η) ∈ [Ψ1, (p− s)B] then
24 while |η◦(k + 1)− η◦(k)| <  do
25 Find η† ∈ [ Ψ1Bp + sp , 1] that maximizes the
function I[(p− sCD)|IAG|+ (1− η)p|IRE|];
26 Set η◦(k) = η† and k = k + 1;
27 end
28 end
29 end
30 return Optimal revenue sharing ratio η◦
Proposition 5. Let the ratio ρ = 3−
√
5
2 and the interval
length L = max
{
Ψ1
Bp ,
Ψ2
Bp , 1− Ψ1Bp − sp , 1− Ψ2Bp − sp
}
. Then,
Algorithm 1 returns the searched maximizer η◦ that is no more
than  away from the actual maximizer η∗ within K iterations,
and K is determined by
K =
⌊
log
(
1
1− ρ
)−1
log
L

⌋
, (29)
where b·c is the rounding down notation.
The proof can be referred to Appendix F. Proposition 5
shows that the CP’s optimal revenue sharing ratio can be
computed in a low complexity O(log 1 ) with the limited
number of iterations, which is desirable for Stage I. Intuitively,
Algorithm 1 finds the optimal solutions in each of the four
cases based on the one-dimensional golden section search
method. Hence, the complexity of Algorithm 1 depends on
the worst-case search performance in the four cases, which
is mainly related to the interval lengths. We thus draw the
conclusion that the derived desirable properties of the profit
function play a very important role in speeding up the search-
ing process while reducing the searching complexity.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we conduct numerical studies to verify
the analytical results obtained in the preceding sections.
Specifically, we will show the system performance under
the equilibrium EDs’ choices and the optimal CP’s incentive
design. In particular, we will show how the EDs’ equilibrium,
the corresponding system performance, and the market shares
change with different system parameters, as well as the im-
pacts of these system parameters on the CP’s profit. Moreover,
we will show the CP’s profit improvement of the Crowd-
MECS system, by comparing with the Non-MEC counterpart.
A. Simulation Setup
In the simulation, the number of EDs I is fixed as 1000
and the transmission cost s is varied within [0.05, 0.2]. In the
Crowd-MECS system, the relations s < sCD ≤ p typically
hold, hence we fix the CP’s transmission cost sCD as 0.4,
and change CP’s content price p within [0.4, 0.6]. We vary
the agents’ serving capacity B from 1 to 2. We choose
these parameters for illustration purposes, and changing these
parameters do not influence the simulation results and key
insights. Moreover, the valuation w and the caching cost c are
realized based on the uniform distributions. In each simulation,
we average over 1000 randomly generated system parameters
regarding w and c as the final simulation result.
Our key targets are to show the comparison between the
non-cooperative EDs’ behaviors (at the equilibrium) in the
game model and the cooperative EDs’ behaviors (social op-
timality) in the centralized optimization model. Meanwhile,
we will characterize the CP’s profit maximization and the
impacts of different system parameters, as well as the CP’s
profit improvement compared with the Non-MEC counterpart.
B. Cooperation vs Non-Cooperation of EDs’ Behaviors
Before we proceed, we first define the welfare of non-
cooperative EDs in the game model and cooperative EDs in
the centralized optimization model, respectively.
Non-Cooperative EDs. To capture the impact of the selfish
and strategic behaviors of EDs in the Stage II subgame, we
define the EDs’ welfare in the non-cooperative scenario as the
sum of all EDs’ payoffs. Recall that in this scenario each ED
is selfish and non-cooperative with the aim of maximizing her
own payoff. Furthermore, we call the welfare in this scenario
as the equilibrium welfare, since it is equal to the sum of all
payoffs at the equilibrium.
Cooperative EDs. The welfare of cooperative EDs cor-
responds to the scenario where all EDs are altruistic and
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Fig. 4. EDs’ welfare vs. revenue sharing ratio with
different transmission costs (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Revenue Sharing Ratio
100
120
140
160
180
200
W
elf
ar
e 
of
 A
ll E
Ds
Fig. 5. EDs’ welfare vs. revenue sharing ratio with
different serving capacities (s = 0.1 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 6. EDs’ welfare vs. revenue sharing ratio with
different content prices (B = 2 and s = 0.1).
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Fig. 7. The number of agents (A) and requesters
(R) at NE vs. revenue sharing ratio with different
transmission costs (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 8. The number of agents (A) and requesters
(R) at SO vs. revenue sharing ratio with different
transmission costs (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 9. Sharing benefit to agents at NE and at SO
vs. revenue sharing ratio with different transmis-
sion costs (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
cooperative to maximize the total payoffs. We call the welfare
in this scenario as the optimal welfare, since it is achieved by
solving the social welfare maximization problem. To maximize
the social welfare in the cooperative scenario, both agents and
requesters will contribute to the welfare. In particular, an agent
can generate the net benefit of w − p− s− c and a requester
can generate the net benefit of w − p − s. Moreover, the CP
shares the net benefit of ηp−s to agents for serving per unit of
the requester. Notice that the number of requesters served by
agents is upper bounded by the total serving capacity B|IAG|.
Hence, the welfare of the cooperative EDs can be derived by
Wso =I ·
∫∫
IAG
(w − p− s− c)gwc(w, c)dwdc
+ I ·
∫∫
IRE
(w − p− s)gwc(w, c)dwdc
+ I · (ηp− s) ·min{|IRE|, B|IAG|}. (30)
To characterize ED’s cooperative behaviors from the cen-
tralized optimization perspective, we define ψ = (ηp −
s) min{ |IRE||IAG| , B}. Then, maximizing Wso requires EDs sat-
isfying w > p + s + c − ψ and c < ψ to be agents and EDs
satisfying w > p + s and c > ψ to be requesters. We thus
have obtained ED’s role selections IAG and IRE. The above
analysis shows that maximizing Wso can be achieved in an
iterative manner, as shown in the following simulation results.
Next, we will characterize the welfare of all EDs and the
profit of the CP at the equilibrium (non-cooperative and de-
noted by NE) and at the centralized optimization (cooperative
and denoted by SO), respectively. Moreover, we will show the
impacts of different system parameters.
1) Welfare of All EDs: Figs. 4, 5, and 6 show the welfare
of all EDs versus the revenue sharing ratio η with different
transmission costs, serving capacities, and content prices at
the equilibrium (NE) and at the centralized optimum (SO),
respectively. We can see that (i) the welfare at NE is less than
that at SO, showing the efficiency loss due to EDs’ selfish and
strategic decision making in the game; (ii) both the welfare at
NE and the welfare at SO increase with CP’s revenue sharing
ratio. The reason is that a larger revenue sharing ratio implies
a larger sharing benefit to the agents, such that more EDs are
incentivized to cache; (iii) the welfare at SO increases faster
than that at NE, especially when the revenue sharing ratio
η exceeds some thresholds (the optimal η∗). That is, a larger
revenue sharing ratio leads to a larger welfare (efficiency) loss,
which also shows that EDs’ selfish behaviors lead to stronger
strategic effects with a larger incentive offered by the CP.
Impact of CP’s Revenue Sharing Ratio. To understand
the reasons for such trends, we further illustrate EDs’ role
selection decisions (|IAG| and |IRE|) and the sharing benefit
Ψ(η). Figs. 7, 8, and 9 show the number of agents, the
number of requesters, and the sharing benefit at NE and at
SO, respectively, where Figs. 7, 8, and 9 share the same
figure legends. We can see that the number of requesters
always decreases with CP’s revenue sharing ratio at NE, while
the number of requesters first decreases and then increases
with CP’s revenue sharing ratio at SO. The reason is that
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Fig. 10. CP’s profit vs. revenue sharing ratio with
different transmission costs (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 11. CP’s profit vs. revenue sharing ratio with
different serving capacity (s = 0.1 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 12. CP’s profit vs. revenue sharing ratio with
different content prices (B = 2 and s = 0.1).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Revenue Sharing Ratio
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
s
Fig. 13. Market shares vs. transmission cost with
serving capacity (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 14. Profit increase ratio of the CP vs. EDs’
transmission cost (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
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Fig. 15. Welfare increase ratio of the EDs vs. EDs’
transmission cost (B = 2 and p = 0.5).
the increasing number of agents causes severe competition
among agents at NE due to EDs’ selfish and non-cooperative
behaviors, such that agents’ serving capacities are not fully
used, i.e., |IRE||IAG| < B. However, the increasing number of
agents at SO can further increase the number of agents due to
EDs’ altruistic and cooperative behaviors, such that agents’
serving capacities are fully used, i.e., |IRE| ≥ B · |IAG|.
Furthermore, different EDs’ behaviors lead to different trends
of the sharing benefit, as shown in Fig. 9. In particular, the
sharing benefit at SO increases linearly in η, since the increase
rate is exactly B according to (8). However, the sharing benefit
at NE increases slower in η, since the increase rate is |IRE||IAG| ,
which is smaller according to Fig. 7 as η increases.
Impacts of System Parameters. Fig. 4 illustrates the
impact of EDs’ transmission cost, showing that a larger
transmission cost induces a lower welfare of EDs. The reason
is that a larger transmission cost implies a lower sharing
benefit, and fewer EDs are incentivized to cache. Fig. 5
illustrates the impact of agents’ serving capacity, showing that
a larger serving capacity of agents induces a higher welfare
of EDs. The reason is that a larger serving capacity implies a
larger unit caching and sharing benefit, since one unit cache
can potentially serve more requesters. Hence, more EDs are
incentivized to cache. Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of CP’s
content price, showing that a larger content price induces a
lower welfare of EDs. The reason is that a larger content
price exerts a negative influence on the caching and sharing
behaviors of EDs, since both agents and requesters need to
pay the price.8
2) Equilibrium Market Shares of EDs: Fig. 13 shows the
market shares distribution of EDs’ role selections versus CP’s
revenue sharing ratio incentive at the equilibrium. We can see
the desirable market distribution, such that a proportion of the
EDs choose to be agents, caching and sharing contents with the
requesters. Once more, we can see that a larger CP’s revenue
sharing incentive leads to more agents at the equilibrium, since
more EDs are incentivized to cache. Moreover, we can show
the impacts of the transmission cost, the serving capacity,
and the content prices on the market distributions of EDs at
the equilibrium, respectively, which exhibit similar trends as
shown in Fig. 7 as well as in Figs. 4-6.
C. CP’s Profit Maximization
We have shown the welfare of EDs at the equilibrium and
at the centralized optimum, as well as the market shares of
EDs in Stage II. Now we further show the profit of the CP at
the equilibrium and at the centralized optimum in Stage I.
Figs. 10, 11, and 12 show the CP’s total profit versus
the revenue sharing ratio under different transmission costs,
serving capacities, and content prices at NE and at SO,
respectively. We can see that the CP’s profit first increases
but eventually decreases with the CP’s revenue sharing ratio,
which is consistent with our previous analysis. Furthermore,
8Notice that an agent can obtain a portion of the price back through sharing
the cached content with a requester. However, this portion of the price is less
than the paid price, and agents are less incentivized as the price grows larger.
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the CP’s profit is piece-wise continuous and unimodal in the
revenue sharing ratio η, such that a unique optimal η exists and
can be found by the tailored golden section search algorithm
with a low complexity as shown in Algorithm 1.
Moreover, the CP’s optimal profit (i) decreases with the
EDs’ transmission cost s. This is because EDs need to bear
more cost when the transmission cost is larger, leading to a
negative effect on the content sharing between EDs. Hence,
more EDs will be served by the CP directly, leading to a
smaller profit; (ii) increases with the agents’ serving capacity
B. This is because agents can serve more requesters with lower
transmission cost, leading to a positive effect on the content
sharing between EDs; (iii) increases with the content price p.
This is because the CP only shares a portion of the revenue to
agents and the remaining revenue contributes to its own profit.
However, a larger CP’s content price induces a lower welfare
of EDs, as shown in Fig. 6. This shows that a larger content
price will eventually jeopardize the CP’s optimal profit, and
a tradeoff therefore exists between EDs’ welfare and CP’s
optimal profit by tuning the parameter of the content price.
D. Comparison with the Non-MEC System
Now we compare the Crowd-MECS system with the Non-
MEC system in terms of the CP’s profit and the EDs’ welfare,
where the CP serves all EDs’ demands directly in the Non-
MEC system. Notice that in the Crowd-MECS system, if the
revenue sharing ratio η = 0, then the CP does not offer
any sharing benefit as the incentive to agents, i.e., Ψ = 0.
According to Fig. 3, we can see that no EDs will choose
to be agents, and all requesting EDs will be served by the
CP directly. Hence, the Non-MEC system is equivalent to
the Crowd-MECS system if the revenue sharing ratio η = 0.
In consequence, Figs. 10-12 have illustrated the comparison
regarding the CP’s profit, and Figs. 4-6 have illustrated the
comparison regarding the EDs’ welfare. We can see that
significant CP’s profit increase and EDs’ welfare increase can
be achieved by Crowd-MECS at the optimal incentive η∗,
compared with those at η = 0.
We further show the CP’s profit increase ratio versus the
EDs’ transmission cost in Fig. 14, where we define the CP’s
profit increase ratio as the ratio of the CP’s optimal profit
increase to the CP’s profit in the Non-MEC system. We can
see that the CP’s profit increase ratio roughly decreases with
the transmission cost, and the maximum profit increase ratio
can be up to 120% in our simulations. Fig. 15 shows the
EDs’ welfare increase ratio versus the EDs’ transmission cost
under the two scenarios, where the EDs’ welfare increase ratio
is defined as the ratio of the EDs’ welfare increase at the
equilibrium to the EDs’ welfare in the Non-MEC system. We
can see that the EDs’ welfare increase ratio roughly increases
with the EDs’ transmission cost, such that the maximum
welfare increase ratio can be up to 50% in our simulations.
Furthermore, Figs. 14 and 15 jointly confirm the win-win
situation of both the CP and EDs in the Crowd-MECS system.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have considered the economic analysis of Crowd-
MECS, i.e., crowdsourcing-based edge caching and peer shar-
ing. Such economic analysis is indispensable for understanding
the strategic interplay of the involved stakeholders (CP and
EDs) and improving the content delivery system performance.
To characterize the CP’s optimal incentive design and the
EDs’ equilibrium behaviors evolution, we formulate a two-
stage Stackelberg game with the unique EDs’ features of
heterogeneous valuations, heterogeneous caching costs, and
limited serving capacity. We show that such a two-stage
game induces a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, which can be
analyzed by using backward induction. Our simulation results
verify the theoretic analysis and the economic viability of the
proposed Crowd-MECS model, showing that both the CP’s
profit and the EDs’ welfare can be improved significantly (e.g.,
by 120% and 50%, respectively), comparing with the Non-
MEC system where the CP serves all requesting EDs directly.
This work is an initial attempt to fully understand the eco-
nomic incentive and strategic interactions of the stakeholders
involved in the Crowd-MECS system. We do make some sim-
plified assumptions that agents obtain the same average sharing
benefit, and each CP can operate the mobile edge caching
and sharing independently. Such assumptions can help derive
analytical results and engineering insights, yet may hardly
be practical. Hence, it opens several interesting directions
for future research. In particular, (i) extending the model to
the scenario where each ED may have different and limited
storage for content caching, leading to the coupling of different
content files when making caching decisions; (ii) considering
the scheduling of the location-dependent requesting EDs, such
that different caching EDs may have different sharing benefit;
(iii) incorporating the competition of multiple CPs into the
incentive mechanisms such that different CPs may compete
to invest the EDs’ resources for caching and sharing content
files. The above extensions call for nontrivial refinements of
the current model and analysis, and hopefully make further
progress and insights towards those realistic issues in the
Crowd-MECS systems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: We will show that there exists a one-to-one
mapping between the strategy profile {z(w, c),∀w, c} and
the sharing benefit Ψ. The reason is that, given any strategy
profile {z(w, c),∀w, c}, the three market shares I˜AG, I˜RE, and
I˜NA will be uniquely determined. Then we can determine the
new sharing benefit Ψ˜ according to Eq. (9). Therefore, if the
strategy profile {z∗(w, c),∀w, c} is a stable point, then it fol-
lows that the sharing benefit Ψ = G(Ψ)/IAG(Ψ). Otherwise,
the sharing benefit Ψ will deviate from G(Ψ)/IAG(Ψ), and
the corresponding strategy profile {z(w, c),∀w, c} will also
change. This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: To prove the proposition, we consider the two
Subcases 1.1 and 1.2 in Case 1, respectively.
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Subcase 1.1: Ψ1 > p + s, or equivalently, B <
2(1−p−s)2
(p+s)(2−p−s) . In this case, the function Θ(Ψ) is given by
Θ(Ψ) =
Ψ− (ηp− s) ·
|IRE|
|IAG| , if Ψ ∈ [Ψ1, (p− s)B],
Ψ− (ηp− s) ·B, if Ψ ∈ [p+ s,Ψ1).
We have two possible cases regarding Ψ, i.e., Ψ ∈ [p+ s,Ψ1)
and Ψ ∈ [Ψ1, (p− s)B], respectively.
(1). When Ψ ∈ [p+s,Ψ1), we have Θ(Ψ) = Ψ−(ηp−s)B,
which is a line segment in [p+ s,Ψ1). If Θ(p+ s) = p+ s−
(ηp−s)B > 0, then Θ(Ψ) > 0 for all Ψ ∈ [p+s,Ψ1). Hence
there does not exist any equilibrium such that Θ(Ψ) = 0.
Expanding Θ(p+ s) > 0 yields
s
p
≤ η < p+ s
Bp
+
s
p
.
When p+sBp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ spp , we have Θ(p + s) ≤ 0. Hence,
the equilibrium depends on the value of Θ(Ψ1). By setting
Θ(Ψ1) > 0, we have η < Ψ1Bp +
s
p . Hence, when
p+ s
Bp
+
s
p
≤ η < Ψ1
Bp
+
s
p
, (31)
there exists only one equilibrium in [p+ s,Ψ1), and when
Ψ1
Bp
+
s
p
≤ η ≤ 1, (32)
there does not exist any equilibrium in [p+ s,Ψ1).
Conclusion: A unique equilibrium exists in the interval [p+
s,Ψ1) if η satisfies the condition (31), and there does not exist
any equilibrium in [p+ s,Ψ1) otherwise.
(2). When Ψ ∈ [Ψ1, (p−s)B], we have Θ(Ψ) = Ψ− (ηp−
s) |IRE||IAG| , which has the same zero points as Θ˜(Ψ) = Ψ|IAG| −
(ηp − s)|IRE|. Note that Θ(Ψ) = Θ˜(Ψ)|IAG| and 0 < |IAG| < 1.
Plugging |IAG| and |IRE| into Θ˜(Ψ) yields
Θ˜(Ψ) = (2− p− s)Ψ2 +
[
(ηp− s)(1− p− s)− (p+ s)
2
2
]
Ψ
− (ηp− s)(1− p− s),
which is a parabola going upwards with Θ˜(0) = −(ηp −
s)(1− p− s) < 0. Hence for Θ˜(Ψ), the existence of the zero
point in [Ψ1, (p− s)B] depends only on Θ˜(Ψ1). Specifically,
if Θ˜(Ψ1) > 0, then there is no equilibrium in [Ψ1, (p− s)B];
and if Θ˜(Ψ1) ≤ 0, then a unique equilibrium exists in
[Ψ1, (p − s)B]. From 1), we know that if Θ(Ψ1) > 0, then
η < Ψ1Bp +
s
p and the two curves intersect in Ψ1. Hence, we
have 0 < Θ˜(Ψ1) = Θ(Ψ1)|IAG| < Θ(Ψ1); On the other hand,
if Θ(Ψ1) ≤ 0, then η ≥ Ψ1Bp + sp and the two curves intersect
in Ψ1. Hence, we have 0 ≥ Θ˜(Ψ1) = Θ(Ψ1)|IAG| > Θ(Ψ1).
We can draw the following conclusion.
Conclusion: A unique equilibrium exists in the interval
[Ψ1, (p− s)B] if η satisfies the condition (32), and there does
not exist any equilibrium in [Ψ1, (p− s)B] otherwise.
To summarize, when Ψ1Bp+
s
p ≤ η ≤ cpp , there exists a unique
equilibrium that belongs to [Ψ1, (p− s)B]; when p+sBp + sp ≤
η < Ψ1Bp +
s
p , there exists a unique equilibrium that belongs to
[p+ s,Ψ1); when sp ≤ η < p+sBp + sp , there does not exist any
equilibrium in [p+ s, (p− s)B].
Subcase 1.2: Ψ1 ≤ p + s, or equivalently, B ≥
2(1−p−s)2
(p+s)(2−p−s) . In this case, the function Θ(Ψ) is given by
Θ(Ψ) = Ψ − (ηp − s) |IRE||IAG| ,∀Ψ ∈ [p + s, (p − s)B], which
has the same zero points as Θ˜(Ψ) = Ψ|IAG| − (ηp− s)|IRE|.
Plugging |IAG| and |IRE| into Θ˜(Ψ), we have
Θ˜(Ψ) = (2− p− s)Ψ2 +
[
(ηp− s)(1− p− s)− (p+ s)
2
2
]
Ψ
− (ηp− s)(1− p− s),
which is a parabola going upwards with Θ˜(0) = −(ηp−s)(1−
p− s) < 0. Hence the zero point of Θ˜(Ψ) in [p+ s, (p− s)B]
depends only on the value of Θ˜(p+s). That is, if Θ˜(p+s) > 0,
no equilibrium exists in [p+s, (p−s)B]; and if Θ˜(p+s) ≤ 0,
there exists a unique equilibrium in [p+s, (p−s)B]. By setting
Θ˜(p+ s) ≤ 0, we have
(2− p− s)(p+ s)2
2p(1− p− s)2 +
s
p
≤ η ≤ 1. (33)
Conclusion: A unique equilibrium exists in the interval [p+
s, (p − s)B] if η satisfies the condition (33), and there does
not exist any equilibrium in [p+ s, (p− s)B] otherwise.
Combining Subcases 1.1 and 1.2, we have Proposition 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof: We prove Proposition 3 by considering the two
Subcases 2.1 and 2.2 in Case 2, respectively.
Subcase 2.1: Ψ2 < p+s, or equivalently, B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 .
In this case, the function Θ(Ψ) is given by
Θ(Ψ) =
Ψ− (ηp− s)
|IRE|
|IAG| , if Ψ ∈ [Ψ2, p+ s],
Ψ− (ηp− s)B, if Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ2].
We have two possible cases regarding Ψ, i.e., Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ2) and
Ψ ∈ [Ψ2, p+ s], respectively.
(1). When Ψ ∈ [0,Ψ2], we have Θ(Ψ) = Ψ − (ηp − s)B,
which is a line segment in [0,Ψ2]. Since Θ(0) = −(ηp −
s)B < 0, the equilibrium depends only on the value of Θ(Ψ2).
Specifically, if Θ(Ψ2) ≥ 0, then a unique equilibrium exists in
the interval [0,Ψ2], and there does not exist any equilibrium
otherwise. Expanding Θ(Ψ2) ≥ 0 yields
s
p
≤ η ≤ Ψ2
Bp
+
s
p
.
(2). When Ψ ∈ [Ψ2, p + s], we have Θ(Ψ) = Ψ − (ηp −
s) |IRE||IAG| , which has the same zero points as Θ˜(Ψ) = Ψ|IAG| −
(ηp − s)|IRE|. Note that Θ(Ψ) = Θ˜(Ψ)|IAG| and 0 < |IAG| < 1.
Plugging |IAG| and |IRE| into Θ˜(Ψ) yields
Θ˜(Ψ) =
Ψ3
2
+ (1− p− s)Ψ2 + (ηp− s)(1− p− s)Ψ
− (ηp− s)(1− p− s),
Since Θ˜(0) = −(ηp− s)(1− p− s) < 0 and Θ˜′(Ψ) = 32Ψ2 +
2(1 − p − s)Ψ + (ηp − s)(1 − p − s) > 0,∀Ψ ∈ [Ψ2, p + s].
Hence, the function Θ˜(Ψ) is monotonically increasing in Ψ ∈
[Ψ2, p + s], and the zero point of Θ˜(Ψ) in [Ψ2,∞) depends
only on the values of Θ˜(Ψ2) and Θ˜(p + s). That is, there
exists a unique equilibrium if and only if Θ˜(Ψ2) ≤ 0 and
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Θ˜(p + s) ≥ 0. From 1), we know that Θ(Ψ2) ≤ 0 implies
Ψ2
Bp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ cpp and the two curves intersect in Ψ2. We have
0 ≥ Θ˜(Ψ2) = Θ(Ψ2)|IAG| > Θ(Ψ2). Hence, the condition
Ψ2
Bp +
s
p ≤ η ≤ cpp can ensure Θ˜(Ψ2) ≤ 0. By expanding
Θ˜(p + s) ≥ 0, we have 0 ≤ η ≤ (p+s)2(2−p−s)2p(1−p−s)2 + sp . Hence,
there exists a unique equilibrium in [Ψ2, p+ s] if and only if
Ψ2
Bp
+
s
p
≤ η ≤ (2− p− s)(p+ s)
2
2p(1− p− s)2 +
s
p
.
Subcase 2.2: Ψ2 ≥ p+s, or equivalently, B ≤ 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 .
Then, Θ(Ψ) = Ψ − (ηp − s)B, which is a line segment in
[0, p + s]. Since Θ(0) = −(ηp − s)B < 0, the equilibrium
depends on the value of Θ(p+s). Hence there exists a unique
equilibrium if and only if Θ(p+ s) ≥ 0, yielding
s
p
≤ η < p+ s
Bp
+
s
p
.
Combining Subcases 2.1 and 2.2, we have Proposition 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: The theorem can be proved by combining the two
cases of the high sharing benefit and the low sharing benefit.
To proceed, we first transform the term (p+s)(2−p−s) into
an equivalent form 2(p+ s)− (p+ s)2, which can be further
rewritten as 1− [1− 2(p+ s) + (p+ s)2]. Hence, we finally
reach the equivalent term 1−(1−p−s)2. This means that the
conditions in terms of the capacity B in Proposition 2 and 3
coincide with each other. Furthermore, the results in Proposi-
tion 2 and 3 are complementary, such that the non-existence
scenarios in Proposition 2 are in accord with the uniqueness
scenarios in Proposition 3, and the reverse is also true. That
is, the mutually exclusive and exhaustive equilibrium results
in Proposition 2 and 3 completely characterize the unique
equilibrium results of the subgame in Stage II. Furthermore,
such unique equilibrium results can be explicitly summarized
by a few mutually exclusive and exhaustive intervals in terms
of the sharing benefit Ψ ∈ [0, (p − s)B], as shown in
Theorem 1.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof: To prove the proposition, we check whether agents
can meet all the demands of requesters, as shown by the
two possible equations in (9). From the equilibrium result
in Theorem 1, we can see that (i) when B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2
and η < Ψ1Bp +
s
p , then the equilibrium is in [0, p + s] or
[p+ s,Ψ1]. The former corresponds to the case in (27) while
the latter corresponds to the case in (23), and in both cases
Θ(Ψ) = Ψ − (ηp − s)B. That is, the agents cannot meet all
the requesters’ demands such that the CP needs to serve the
extra demand of the requesters. Hence, the corresponding CP’s
profit contains three parts, i.e., V(η) = I[(p−sCD)|IAG|+(1−
η)pB|IAG|+ (|IRE| −B|IAG|)(p− sCD)], as shown in Section
III-D. Moreover, (ii) when B ≤ 2(1−p−s)21−(1−p−s)2 and η ≥ Ψ1Bp + sp ,
then the equilibrium is in [Ψ1, (sp− s)B], which corresponds
to the case in (23), and in this case Θ(Ψ) = Ψ−(ηp−s) |IRE||IAG| .
That is, the agents can meet all the requesters’ demands.
Hence, the corresponding CP’s profit contains two parts, i.e.,
V(η) = I[(p− sCD)|IAG|+ (1−η)p|IRE|], as shown in Section
III-D. Combining the above two cases (i) and (ii), it follows
from (9) that η0 = Ψ1Bp +
s
p . Similarly, by using the same
analysis procedure, it follows that if B > 2(1−p−s)
2
1−(1−p−s)2 , then
η0 =
Ψ2
Bp +
s
p .
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof: To prove the proposition, we describe the detailed
search process as follows. First, we determine the lower bound
ηl and the upper bound ηu for any given interval η ∈ [ηl, ηu],
which is assumed to be known to contain the maximum of
the profit function V(η). Then, we determine two intermediate
points η1 and η2 such that η1 = ηl + d and η2 = ηu − d,
where d = (1 − ρ)(ηu − ηl). Finally, if V(η1) > V(η2),
then we update ηl, η1, η2, and ηu as ηl = η2, η2 = η1,
ηu = ηu, and η1 = ηl + (1 − ρ)(ηu − ηl), respectively.
If V(η1) < V(η2), then we update ηl, η1, η2, and ηu as
ηl = ηl, ηu = η1, η1 = η2, and η2 = ηu − (1 − ρ)(ηu − ηl),
respectively. Iterating the above process until ηu − ηl ≤ 
(a sufficiently small number), then the maximum occurs at
ηu+ηl
2 and stop iterating. As shown in Algorithm 1, there are
four possible intervals of η with the maximum interval length
L = max
{
Ψ1
Bp ,
Ψ2
Bp , 1− Ψ1Bp − sp , 1− Ψ2Bp − sp
}
. Then, in the
worst case, starting with an interval of length L, to reach
an interval with length less than or equal to , we need K
iterations, where K is the first integer such that L(1−ρ)K ≤ .
We further have
K ≤ log
(
1
1− ρ
)−1
log
L

.
That is, the iteration K is given by
K =
⌊
log
(
1
1− ρ
)−1
log
L

⌋
.
This completes the proof.
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